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Abstract: 
A large body of literature has shown that peer-to-peer punishment is effective in enforcing 
cooperation norms in dilemmas. Kamei [2014, Economics Letters 124, pp.199-202] provides 
experimental evidence on the prevalence of heterogeneous conditional punishment types by 
conducting an experiment with a strategy method in the United States. This note reports a 
replication experiment using subjects in England. As consistent with Kamei (2014), the 
experiment indicates that people’s punishment decisions are on average positively proportional 
to the others’ punishment toward the target. However, it also indicates interesting cross-country 
differences in the distribution of human conditional punishment types.  
JEL classification: C91, C92, D70, H41 
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1.  Introduction 
One of the most established findings in the last few decades from experimental research 
is that peer-to-peer punishment opportunities help resolve people’s cooperation dilemmas under 
some conditions because people punish norm violators even if they incur cost for punishment 
(e.g., Fehr and Gächter 2000 and 2002). Kamei (2014) provides experimental evidence that (a) 
people’s punishment behavior to a target is conditional upon other members’ punishment acts to 
that target and (b) individuals’ conditional punishment behaviors are heterogeneous. 
The experiment in Kamei (2014) was conducted in Michigan, the United States. But, how 
does people’s conditional punishment behavior differ by subject pool? This is an important 
question to explore because the literature has shown that there exists a significant cross-country 
difference in people’s unconditional punishment behavior in various games (e.g., Henrich et al. 
2006, Herrmann et al. 2008) and therefore people’s conditional punishment behavior may also 
depend on subject pool. This note reports the results of a replication experiment of Kamei (2014) 
conducted in England. The results show that two important findings in Kamei (2014) hold also 
for subjects in England. First, subjects in England on average exhibit the pattern of conditional 
punishers: the intensity of people’s punishment imposed on a target is positively proportional to 
the others’ punishment strength toward the target, whether the target is a cooperator or a non-
cooperator. Second, individual conditional punishment types are heterogeneous. Nevertheless, 
this replication experiment reveals some significant cross-country differences. For instance, the 
distributions of conditional punishment types are significantly different between the two research 
sites. This implies that we cannot assume people’s conditional punishment behaviors only from 
Kamei (2014) and we may need some calibration for each subject pool in order to know people’s 
conditional punishment preferences in a given study. 
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The remainder of this note proceeds as follows: Section 2 briefly describes the 
experimental design. Section 3 reports results in England and compare them against the data of 
Kamei (2014). Section 4 concludes. 
2. Experiment 
 At the onset of the experiment, each subject was randomly assigned to a group of four, 
was given an endowment of ten points, and simultaneously decided whether to allocate the ten 
points to a group account or a private account (binary choice). If subject i allocates it to the 
private account, she obtains 10 points as a payoff. If she instead allocates 10 points to the group 
account, each of the four group members obtains 5 points. In other words, the marginal per-
capita return (MPCR) is 0.5 in the experiment. 
 Each member made two kinds of punishment decisions before being informed of their 
group members’ contribution decisions. First, they were asked to submit an amount that they 
wish to reduce from the payoff of a group member who chose to allocate to the private account 
(non-cooperator, hereafter). They were also asked to decide an amount that they wish to reduce 
from the payoff of a group member who chose to allocate to the group account (cooperator, 
hereafter). We call these two decisions “unconditional punishment decisions.”1 A reduction 
amount to a member must be an integer between 0 and 4. Second, after all subjects made the two 
unconditional punishment decisions, they were asked how many punishment points they would 
assign to a member, assuming that the two remaining group members on average assign a 
reduction amount x  {0, 0.5, 1.0, 1.5, 2.0, 2.5, 3.0, 3.5, 4.0} to that member. Subjects made 
these “conditional punishment” decisions to each of a cooperator and a non-cooperator, 
                                                          
1
 The experimental design is identical to Kamei (2014), except that a strategy method was used for subjects’ 
unconditional punishment decisions in the present paper. The reason that we used the strategy method is to collect 
more observations on subjects’ unconditional punishment acts.  
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separately. Thus, this conditional punishment task involves 18 (= 29) decisions. Both the 
unconditional and conditional punishment decisions were incentive-compatible. After four 
members in a group completed the unconditional punishment decisions and then submitted the 
conditional punishment form, one out of the four members’ conditional reduction schedules will 
be randomly selected to be used in each group. The cost ratio of the punishment technology was 
1: 3 (the punisher: the punished). 
3. Results 
 The replication experiment was conducted at the University of York in England. A total 
of 216 students there participated in the experiment. The subjects voluntarily registered for and 
participated in the sessions, responding to solicitation messages sent through the Hamburg 
Registration and Organization Online Tool (HROOT; see Bock 2014). All experiments except 
instructions were programmed in Ztree (Fischbacher 2007). At the onset of the experiment, 
instructions (see Kamei (2014)) were distributed to the subjects and were read aloud; then 
subjects were asked to answer comprehension questions before the experiment started.
2
  
 We first study the total average conditional punishment schedules. As shown in Fig. 1, 
the total average conditional punishment to a target has a positive intercept and is increasing in 
other members’ average punishment points to the target, whether the target is a cooperator or a 
non-cooperator (lines with triangles). Both the intercepts and slopes are significantly positive at 
the 5% level or more (see columns (3) and (4) of Part (1), Appendix Table A.1). This result 
                                                          
2
 This replication experiment was conducted along with some treatments of Kamei (2017). Specifically, it was 
included at the onset of the Kamei (2017)’s experiment. Subjects were informed that they would not interact with 
group members of the conditional punishment experiment in the later experiment (i.e., the perfect stranger matching 
protocol was used between the present experiment and Kamei (2017)). Further, subjects were not informed of the 
details of the experiment of Kamei (2017) when they underwent the conditional punishment experiment.  The 
conversion rate was: 1 pound sterling was equal to 5 points in the experiment.   
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implies that subjects care about the income inequality between them and other punishers. This 
suggests that Result 1 in Kamei (2014) is robust when using subjects in England. 
RESULT I: Result 1 in Kamei (2014) holds for subjects in England. 
 Despite Result I, a cross-country difference is observed. Fig. 1 shows the average 
conditional punishment schedules for each of cooperators and non-cooperators (dash lines with 
rectangles and chain lines with diamonds). It indicates that cooperators impose significantly 
stronger conditional punishment on non-cooperators than non-cooperators do (also see columns 
(1) and (2) in Part (2) of Appendix Table A.1). This finding supports the idea that a cooperator 
cares about the income inequality between her and the non-cooperator (the target of punishment) 
in her group. However, this pattern is in contrast with the results in the United States: non-
cooperators impose stronger (although not significantly) conditional punishment on non-
cooperators than cooperators do (see Fig. 1(a) and Appendix Table B.2, both in Kamei (2014)). 
Considering that the payoff of a non-cooperator is the same as that of another non-cooperator 
(the target of punishment) before the punishment stage, the pattern in the United States suggests 
that the non-cooperators may obtain higher utility when another non-cooperator in their groups 
obtain lower material payoffs; which is consistent with the spiteful preferences proposed by 
Levine (1998). This cross-country difference seems to suggest that the types of people’s other-
regarding preferences may differ by country. 
RESULT II: Unlike Kamei (2014), in England, cooperators impose significantly stronger 
conditional punishment on non-cooperators than non-cooperators do. 
As for conditional punishment targeted at cooperators, the punishment intensity by non-
cooperators is significantly stronger than that by cooperators in both the United States and 
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England (see again Appendix Table A.1 of the present paper and Appendix Table B.2 in Kamei 
(2014)). This suggests that non-cooperators are the sources of anti-social punishment. 
 A look at the individuals’ conditional punishment schedules reveals that their conditional 
punishment profiles are heterogeneous as in Kamei (2014). Fig. 2 shows the distributions of 
conditional punishment types for the subjects in England and the United States. As in Kamei 
(2014), the data shows that there are five kinds of conditional punishment types: pro-social 
conditional punishers (those who punish non-cooperators with a strength positively proportional 
to the others’ punishment targeted at the non-cooperators, but do not conditionally punish 
cooperators), anti-social conditional punishers (those who punish non-cooperators in the same 
manner as the pro-social conditional punishers, and also conditionally punish cooperators in 
whatever way possible), free-riders (those who do not punish any one, no matter what 
circumstance), other pro-social punishers (those who conditionally punish non-cooperators only, 
but are not classified as the pro-social conditional punishers), and other anti-social punishers 
(those who conditionally punish cooperators but are not classified as the anti-social conditional 
punishers). However, the distribution of conditional punishment types is significantly different 
between the two research sites. For instance, the percentage of the free-riders in the England 
sample (36.1%) is significantly smaller than that in the USA sample (53.8%).
3
 The significantly 
smaller percentage of free-riders implies that people’s punishment may be more effective in 
enforcing cooperation norms in England than in the United States. One example would be 
feedback or rating systems on online platforms. Our results may mean that users in England 
spend more cost (e.g., time) than those in the United States in writing comments for bad shipping 
experiences when they see others have already written similar reviews there. 
                                                          
3
 A Fisher’s exact test indicates that the difference is significant at the 5% level (two-sided p-value = .026). 
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RESULT III: Conditional punishment types are heterogeneous in England as is the case in the 
United States. However, the distribution of the conditional punishment types in England differs 
from that in the United States.  
Lastly, we note that as in Kamei (2014), the elicited conditional punishment types have 
high predictability for subjects’ unconditional punishment acts in England (Appendix Table A.2). 
First, the free-rider types unconditionally punish a target very little, whether the target is a 
cooperator or a non-cooperator. Second, the pro-social conditional punishers and the other pro-
social punishers unconditionally impose large punishment points on non-cooperators, but they 
unconditionally impose almost no punishment points on cooperators. Third, the anti-social 
conditional punishers and the other anti-social punishers impose large punishment points on both 
cooperators and non-cooperators.  
4. Conclusions 
 This note reports that subjects’ total average conditional punishment to a target in 
England is increasing in others’ punishment to the target, which is consistent with Kamei (2014). 
The data also shows that subjects’ conditional punishment schedules are heterogeneous in 
England. Nevertheless, a detailed look at the data reveals significant cross-country differences as 
summarized in Results II and III.  This provides a useful remark to readers as to how to interpret 
the findings of Kamei (2014): although the overall conditional punishment schedules are robust 
as shown in Result I, the degree of conditional punishment behavior and/or the distribution of 
conditional punishment types can be different by country. The distribution of punishment types 
could affect the evolution of cooperation in societies or organizations. For instance, in Hermann 
et al. (2008), contribution dynamics between some countries are different even though the 
patterns of unconditional punishment are similar to each other (e.g., St. Gallen versus Chengdu). 
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A potential reason other than the ones discussed in Hermann et al. is that these different 
contribution patterns are partly caused by cross-country differences in the distribution of 
conditional punishment types. This result also suggests that calibration of people’s conditional 
punishment behaviors for each subject population may be required, for example, if one engages 
in a theoretical study in which conditional punishment types are assumed. 
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Fig 1. Average Conditional Punishment Schedules 
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Fig 2. Distributions of Conditional Punishment Types in the United States and England 
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Notes: See the online Appendix for the criterion of classifying a subject into one of the five types. 
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The method to classify subjects into the five conditional punishment types [which is the same 
method used in Kamei (2014)]: 
 A “free-rider” is defined as a subject who does not punish a person, no matter how many 
punishment points the other two members impose on that person.  
 A “pro-social (anti-social) conditional punisher” is defined as a subject whose Spearman’s ρ 
between his or her conditional punishment points targeted at a non-cooperator and the 
remaining members’ average punishment points targeted at the non-cooperator is 
significantly positive at the 5% level (i.e., two-sided p-value < .05) and whose conditional 
punishment decisions targeted at a cooperator are (are not) always 0. 
 An “other pro-social punisher” is defined as a subject who conditionally punishes a non-
cooperator but is not classified as a pro-social conditional punisher and whose conditional 
punishment decisions targeted at a cooperator are always 0.  
 An “other anti-social punisher” is defined as a subject who conditionally punishes a 
cooperator but is not classified as an anti-social conditional punisher. 
 
Pages 2 to 5 of this Appendix include additional tables that supplement the manuscript. 
  
2 
 
Table A.1: Total Average Conditional Punishment Schedules for Each Target (A Cooperator or 
a Non-cooperator) 
This is a replication of the analyses included in Appendix Table B.2 of Kamei (2014), using the 
subjects in England.  
(1) The total average conditional punishment schedules 
Dependent  
Variable: 
Independent  
Variable: 
    
Subject j’s conditional punishment decisions to a target  {0, 1, 2, 3, 4} 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
    
     
(a) 1{the target is a non-cooperator}  .99*** -.49* .083*** -.87*** 
 (.080) (.27) (.092) (.31) 
     
(b) 1{the target is a cooperator}  .39*** -3.03*** .26*** -3.63*** 
 (.055) (.42) (.053) (.46) 
     
(c) Other members’ 
average punishment 
points to the target  1{the 
target is a non-cooperator} 
---- ---- 
.084*** 
(.030) 
.19** 
(.085) 
     
(d) Other members’ 
average punishment 
points to the target  1{the 
target is a cooperator} 
---- ---- 
.063*** 
(.018) 
.30*** 
(.082) 
     
# of Observations 3,888 3,888 3,888 3,888 
Log Pseudolikelihood ---- -4213.7 ---- -4204.2 
F 81.13 28.53 40.68 18.17 
Prob > F .0000 .0000 .0000 .0000 
R-squared .2959 ---- .3007 ---- 
     
Test Results     
     
F test for H0: (a) = (b)     
F 56.50 49.86 32.17 40.82 
p-value (two-sided) .0000*** .0000*** .0000*** .0000*** 
     
F test for H0: (c) = (d)     
F ---- ---- 0.48 1.11 
p-value (two-sided) ---- ---- .4886 .2931 
     
 
Notes: Linear regressions with no constant terms and with robust standard errors clustered by subject ID in columns 
(1) and (3), and tobit regressions with no constant terms and with robust standard errors clustered by subject ID in 
columns (2) and (4). The numbers of left-(right-) censored observations are 2647(262) in columns (2) and (4).  
1{the target is a cooperator} =1 if the target of punishment is a cooperator; = 0 otherwise. 
1{the target is a non-cooperator} =1 if the target of punishment is a non-cooperator; = 0 otherwise. 
  *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 0.10 level, at the 0.05 level and at the 0.01 level, respectively. 
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(2) The average conditional punishment schedules by subjects’ cooperativeness (a cooperator or 
a non-cooperator) 
Dependent  
Variable: 
Independent  
Variable: 
    
Subject j’s conditional punishment decisions to a target  {0, 1, 2, 3, 4} 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
    
     
(a) 1{the target is a non-cooperator 
and subject j is a non-cooperator} 
.69*** 
(.14) 
-1.59*** 
(.57) 
.36*** 
(.11) 
-2.40*** 
(.59) 
     
(b) 1{the target is a non-cooperator 
and subject j is a cooperator} 
1.10*** 
(.096) 
-.14 
(.28) 
.98*** 
(.11) 
-.39 
(.33) 
     
(c) 1{the target is a cooperator and 
subject j is a non-cooperator} 
.61*** 
(.13) 
-1.91*** 
(.59) 
.40*** 
(.12) 
-2.50*** 
(.61) 
     
(d) 1{the target is a cooperator and 
subject j is a cooperator} 
.31*** 
(.058) 
-3.41*** 
(.47) 
.21*** 
(.058) 
-4.02*** 
(.53) 
     
Other members’ average 
punishment points to the 
target  variable (a) 
---- ---- 
.16*** 
(.057) 
.41** 
(.19) 
     
Other members’ average 
punishment points to the 
target  variable (b) 
---- ---- 
.058 
(.036) 
.13 
(.093) 
     
Other members’ average 
punishment points to the 
target  variable (c) 
---- ---- 
.10** 
(.042) 
.30** 
(.13) 
     
Other members’ average 
punishment points to the 
target  variable (d) 
---- ---- 
.050** 
(.020) 
.31*** 
(.10) 
     
# of Observations 3,888 3,888 3,888 3,888 
Log Pseudolikelihood ---- -4172.2 ---- -4161.1 
F 41.39 15.38 20.81 9.58 
Prob > F .0000 .0000 .0000 .0000 
R-squared .3084 ---- .3142 ---- 
     
Test Results     
     
F test for H0: (a) = (b)     
F 6.01 5.92 ---- ---- 
p-value (two-sided) .0150** .0150** ---- ---- 
     
F test for H0: (c) = (d)     
F 4.23 5.34 ---- ---- 
p-value (two-sided) .0409** .0209** ---- ---- 
     
F test for H0: (a) = (c)     
F .48 .56 ---- ---- 
p-value (two-sided) .4872 .4529 ---- ---- 
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F test for H0: (a) = (c)     
F 65.09 54.93 ---- ---- 
p-value (two-sided) .0000*** .0000*** ---- ---- 
     
 
Notes: Linear regressions with no constant terms and with robust standard errors clustered by subject ID in columns 
(1) and (3), and tobit regressions with no constant terms and with robust standard errors clustered by subject ID in 
columns (2) and (4). The numbers of left-(right-) censored observations are 2647(262) in columns (2) and (4).  
1{the target is a non-cooperator and subject j is a non-cooperator} =1 if the target of punishment is a non-cooperator and j is a non-
cooperator; = 0 otherwise. 1{the target is a non-cooperator and subject j is a cooperator} =1 if the target of punishment is a non-
cooperator and j is a cooperator; = 0 otherwise. 1{the target is a cooperator and subject j is a non-cooperator} =1 if the target of 
punishment is a cooperator and j is a non-cooperator; = 0 otherwise. 1{the target is a cooperator and subject j is a cooperator} =1 if 
the target of punishment is a cooperator and j is a cooperator; = 0 otherwise.    
   *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 0.10 level, at the 0.05 level and at the 0.01 level, respectively. 
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Table A.2: Unconditional Punishment Decisions by Conditional Punishment Types 
 
Dependent  
Variable: 
 
 
Independent  
Variable: 
      
Subject j’s unconditional punishment decisions to a target i  {0, 1, 2, 3, 4} 
(a) i is a non-cooperator (b) i is a cooperator 
All 
decisions 
j is a 
cooperator 
j is a non-
cooperator 
All 
decisions 
j is a 
cooperator 
j is a non-
cooperator 
(a1) (a2) (a3) (b1) (b2) (a4) 
      
       
Pro-social conditional 
punisher dummy 
1.09*** 
(.22) 
1.11*** 
(.18) 
1.00 
(.91) 
.14 
(.10) 
.17 
(.12) 
.00 
(n.a.) 
       
Anti-social conditional 
punisher dummy 
1.21*** 
(.33) 
1.59*** 
(.40) 
.29 
(.18) 
.79*** 
(.22) 
.71** 
(.28) 
1.00** 
(.48) 
       
Free-rider dummy 
.064* 
(.037) 
.06 
(.044) 
.071 
(.072) 
.00 
(n.a.) 
.00 
(n.a.) 
.00 
(n.a.) 
       
Other pro-social 
punisher dummy 
1.64*** 
(.17) 
1.69*** 
(.18) 
.50 
(.37) 
.00 
(n.a.) 
.00 
(n.a.) 
.00 
(n.a.) 
       
Other anti-social 
punisher dummy 
1.72*** 
(.22) 
1.91*** 
(.23) 
1.38*** 
(.44) 
.94*** 
(.17) 
.61*** 
(.20) 
1.54*** 
(.34) 
       
# of Observations 216 162 54 216 162 54 
Adjusted R-squared .5842 .6540 .4018 .3291 .2611 .5320 
       
 
Notes: Linear regressions with no constant terms and standard errors clustered by group ID. The Pro-social 
conditional punisher dummy equals 1 if j is classified as a pro-social conditional punisher; and 0 otherwise. The 
Anti-social conditional punisher dummy equals 1 if j is classified as an anti-social conditional punisher; and 0 
otherwise. The Free-rider dummy equals 1 if j is classified as a free-rider; and 0 otherwise. The Other pro-social 
punisher dummy equals 1 if j is classified as an other pro-social punisher; and 0 otherwise. The Other anti-social 
punisher dummy equals 1 if j is classified as an other anti-social punisher; and 0 otherwise. 
 *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 0.10 level, at the 0.05 level and at the 0.01 level, respectively. 
 
